Information Avoidance in Education Investment by Yang, Jeffrey
University of Pennsylvania 
ScholarlyCommons 
Wharton Research Scholars Wharton Undergraduate Research 
5-2019 
Information Avoidance in Education Investment 
Jeffrey Yang 
University of Pennsylvania 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/wharton_research_scholars 
 Part of the Business Commons, and the Education Commons 
Yang, Jeffrey, "Information Avoidance in Education Investment" (2019). Wharton Research Scholars. 184. 
https://repository.upenn.edu/wharton_research_scholars/184 
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/wharton_research_scholars/184 
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu. 
Information Avoidance in Education Investment 
Abstract 
Work in education economics has shown that college undergraduates are systematically misinformed 
about how their choice of major is likely to affect future earnings, even though information about the 
major-earnings relationship can be obtained at low cost. Information avoidance, a behavioral 
phenomenon in which an individual is averse to obtaining costless information, could explain this 
information gap among college undergraduates. We test for information avoidance in a lab experiment in 
which undergraduate subjects supply their willingness to pay for information about the major-earnings 
relationship. We find that a material amount of subjects are willing to pay to avoid the earnings 
information, and that the rate of information avoidance decreases with respect to the instrumental value 
of the information. 
Keywords 
education investment, information avoidance 
Disciplines 
Business | Education 
This thesis or dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/
wharton_research_scholars/184 
Information Avoidance in Education
Investment
By
Jeffrey Yang
An Undergraduate Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
WHARTON RESEARCH SCHOLARS
Faculty Advisor:
Judd B. Kessler
Associate Professor, Business Economics and Public Policy
THE WHARTON SCHOOL, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
MAY 2019
Information Avoidance in Education
Investment
Jeffrey Yang
Abstract
Work in education economics has shown that college undergraduates are systemati-
cally misinformed about how their choice of major is likely to affect future earnings,
even though information about the major-earnings relationship can be obtained at
low cost. Information avoidance, a behavioral phenomenon in which an individual is
averse to obtaining costless information, could explain this information gap amongst
college undergraduates. We test for information avoidance in a lab experiment in
which undergraduate subjects supply their willingness to pay for information about the
major-earnings relationship. We find that a material amount of subjects are willing
to pay to avoid the earnings information, and that the rate of information avoidance
decreases with respect to the instrumental value of the information.
1 Introduction
One of the most important human capital investment decisions that college undergraduates
make is their choice of major. Given that a college graduate’s major has a large effect on the
jobs and earnings they obtain throughout their careers (Robst 2007), one might expect that
students choosing between majors seek to use information about how their choice impacts
their labor market outcomes-and in particular, their expected earnings.
Despite the availability of rich historical data on earnings by major available online,
past work has shown that students systematically hold incorrect beliefs about not just their
expected earnings conditional on major, but also about ordinal comparisons of average salaries
between different majors. Conlon (2017) finds that among a sample of college students asked
to provide their beliefs about the average salary by field of study, mean absolute errors range
from $16,200 to $49,000, and that almost a third of subjects incorrectly estimate which of the
two fields of study they are most considering is associated with a higher average salary, with
two-thirds of subjects ranking their top three fields of study incorrectly. Similarly, Wiswall
& Zafar (2015) find errors in expected salary beliefs amongst undergraduate subjects with
comparable magnitudes; for example, they find that on average, subjects under-estimate the
average salaries of male workers with no college degrees by $9,890 and over-estimate average
earnings of male Economics/Business graduates by $34,750.
This misinformation has real and significant costs: Hastings et al. (2016) find that
students who overestimate their earnings are more likely to choose degree programs in which
students have historically had lower graduation rates, lower earnings, and a higher chance
of default on student loans. That students are so misinformed about information that is
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both instrumental to their human capital investment decisions and can be obtained at a
low cost raises serious welfare concerns, and a small but growing literature has explored the
effectiveness of various interventions in which correct information is supplied to students
(Conlon 2017, Hastings et al 2016, Wiswall & Zafar 2015).
However, an equally important yet less explored question is why this information gap exists
in the first place. It could be that students do not find earnings information valuable: that
they place low weight on expected earnings as an input to major choice, or that they possess
higher quality private information about their earnings potential. Existing evidence points
away from this explanation, however; studies on interventions have found that when their
beliefs are corrected, students are more likely to change their major to those associated with
higher expected earnings (Conlon 2017, Hastings et al 2016), suggesting that this information
does carry instrumental value for students. Even if we accept these explanations as true, they
nevertheless have difficulty reconciling the misinformation amongst college students with the
low cost of information search, given the standard economic view that more information in
non-strategic contexts is always weakly preferred.
To this end, behavioral theories of information avoidance - defined here as a preference
for avoiding costless information - present a promising direction of inquiry. The theoretical
literature proposed various mechanisms that can rationalize information avoidance (see
Golman et al. 2017 for a review). One such class of theories posits that economic agents have
preferences over their beliefs, captured by “anticipatory” or “ego” utility (Brunnermeier &
Parker 2005, Köszegi 2006, Köszegi 2010, Caplin & Leahy 2001); these models can generate
the prediction that individuals avoid information that negatively impacts their expected
anticipatory utility. To give a concrete example in our setting, a student who knows he would
suffer stress or dread from receiving bad news about future earnings might prefer to keep
himself uninformed. Another class of theories generates predictions of information avoidance
by positing that beliefs have “instrumental value” in that they impact material outcomes.
Bénabou & Tirole (2002) propose a multi-period model of a present-biased agent who decides
whether or not to learn about his ability in period 0 and how much effort to invest in a task
in period 1; they show that the agent’s dynamic inconsistency can lead to the period 0 agent
avoiding information that may decrease the period 1 agent’s motivation to complete the task.
Similarly, Compte & Postlewaite (2004) model an agent that undertakes a risky venture and
whose objective probability of success depends on her beliefs as to the likelihood of success;
they find that under certain conditions the agent may be averse to learning bad news about
her ability. To give an example in our setting, a student who knows that bad news about the
returns to pursuing her current major will demotivate her from studying hard might avoid
learning about her true earnings as a self-control mechanism.
The empirical literature has established evidence of information avoidance in a variety of
domains, in particular health and management. In a seminal study, Oster et al. (2013) find
that fewer than 10% of individuals at risk for Huntington’s disease, an inherited neurodegen-
erative disease, choose to get tested for the disease even when the test is perfectly informative
and free. Interestingly, individuals who remain untested display an optimistic bias about the
likelihood that they have the disease, and make similar life choices, such as when to retire or
get married, as at-risk individuals who tested negative for the disease. Similarly, Sullivan et
al. (2004) find that in a survey of at-risk individuals who had tested for HIV, 18% failed to
return to the test center to collect test results, and of these individuals, 23% reported that
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fear of hearing the results motivated their decision not to learn about the test outcome. With
perhaps the most stark result, Ganguly & Tasoff (2016) conduct an experiment in which
subjects, drawn from an undergraduate population, are given the opportunity to get tested
for two sexually-transmitted diseases, HPV-1 and HPV-2. They find that even when offered
$10 to see the results of the test, a material proportion of subjects refuse to obtain test results.
In the management literature, several studies (Deshpande and Kohli 1989; Schulz-Hardt et
al. 2000) find that managers avoid data and feedback from their employees that suggests
that they had made poor decisions, even if learning the information would allow them to
reverse their preliminary decisions and achieve better outcomes. The fact that information
avoidance has been documented in field settings in which the stakes are large and there are
real costs to remaining misinformed raises the following question: can the information gap in
our setting be explained by the standard economic model of rational choice, or are behavioral
concerns of information avoidance at play?
To answer this question, we elicit college undergraduates’ willingness to pay for information
about expected earnings by major in a laboratory expeirment. Subjects, drawn from a
population of college undergraduates, are first asked to provide their intended field of study;
they are then asked to supply their beliefs of their own expected future earnings and the
average population earnings, given their chosen field. At this stage, subjects are given an
opportunity to learn the true population earnings through the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak
(BDM) mechanism, which asks subjects whether they would want to receive the information at
a menu of different prices and then draws one price at random to implement, thus incentivizing
subjects to truthfully report their willingness to pay. Importantly, the menu will include
negative prices to test for information avoidance-that is, the subject can choose to forgo the
information at a cost to themselves. Finally, subjects are again asked for their beliefs of their
own expected earnings. To examine how the instrumental value of information interacts with
information avoidance, subjects will be assigned to take the experiment either before or after
the university’s course add deadline for the semester. This exploits the field environment’s
natural variation in the value of earnings information, as this information is more valuable
for subjects deciding between various fields of study before the add deadline locks them into
their courses for the semester, after which the costs associated with switching a major are
higher.
We find that 10.34% of subjects are willing to pay money to avoid receiving the earnings
information, strong evidence of information avoidance at work. Furthermore, 20.26% of
subjects were weakly information avoidant, in that they were unwilling to receive the
information even if it was free. We also find that subjects taking the study after the course
add deadline are more likely to be information avoidant, suggesting that the incidence of
information avoidance is decreasing in the instrumental value of the information.
This study’s contribution to the economic literature is twofold. First, the study sheds
light on a possible mechanism explaining the empirical puzzle of why college undergraduates
are misinformed about the returns to various majors: information avoidance. Previous work
in this domain has focused on establishing the presence of this information gap, or testing the
effectiveness of interventions that correct for student’s misinformed beliefs. To our knowledge,
this is the first study to measure students’ willingness to pay for information about the
returns to college majors, and to explicitly test for whether students’ misinformed beliefs
about the returns to college majors can be explained by rational choice or behavioral concerns.
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Second, this study contributes to the growing economic literature on information avoidance
by providing an empirical test for the existence of the behavior in a novel field environment,
where the stakes are real and the economic consequences significant. Through the BDM
mechanism, this study cleanly establishes that information avoidance is at work in the domain
of education investment, suggesting a role for future work investigating information avoidance
as a possible mechanism for misspecified beliefs in education investment.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the experimental design, and Section
3 discusses the results. Section 4 concludes.
4
2 Experimental Design
Undergraduate subjects were recruited via the Wharton Behavioral Lab to participate in
an experiment for a base payment of $5. In addition to the base payment, subjects had an
opportunity to earn a bonus payment based on their choices in the experiment.
The experimental procedure is as follows. Subjects are first asked to specify their intended
undergraduate major (subjects pursuing more than one major are asked to specify the major
most closely associated with their career interests). Based on their specified major, subjects
are then told which field of study their intended major is classified under. Each major
is classified under 1 of 10 fields of study, which are based on the taxonomy used by the
US Census American Community Survey (ACS), with modifications made to increase the
similarity of subject matter and career outcomes associated with the majors within each field.
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Subjects are then told that they will have the opportunity to receive information about
the earnings associated with each field of study. In particular, for each field of study, subjects
have the opportunity to learn the average annual earnings of full-time workers aged 25-30
with a bachelor’s degree in that field, as computed from the 2012-2016 ACS data. To
make the earnings information more relevant to our subject population, these averages are
computed from the population of workers residing in the following cities: New York, San
Francisco/Silicon Valley, Philadelphia, and Washington D.C., four popular destination cities
for University of Pennsylvania graduates.
Before they are given the opportunity to receive this information, however, subjects are
Figure 2.1: Field of Study Classification
1For example, we grouped business and economics majors under the "Business and Economics" field, due
to the similarity of subject matter and career outcomes associated with those degrees. See Figure A.5 in the
Appendix for the full major classification used in the study.
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first asked to supply their own estimates for these population earnings statistics. In addition,
subjects are asked for their beliefs about their own future annual earnings, five years after
graduation.
After subjects’ earnings beliefs have been elicited, they are given the opportunity to
receive the earnings information through the BDM mechanism. Subjects make 17 binary
decisions; each decision asks if the subject would prefer to receive the earnings information
and receive $2 in bonus earnings, versus not receive the information and receive $X in bonus
earnings, where X ∈ {0, 0.25, 0.5, ..., 3.75, 4}. To incentivize each decision, subjects are told
that one of the 17 decisions will be randomly selected, and the choice the subject made for
that decision will be implemented. Key to this mechanism is that subjects can elect to give
up bonus earnings in order to avoid receiving the information in decisions for which X < 2.
To incentivize truthful responses to the BDM mechanism, each of the 17 decisions has
a positive probability of being selected. However, to investigate how subjects revise their
self-earnings beliefs after receiving the earnings information, the decision with X = 0 is
chosen with probability 0.84, and the remaining decisions are each chosen with probability
0.01; by placing most of the probability on the decision for which subjects are presumably
least likely to avoid the information, we maximize the probability that the subjects receive
the information, regardless of their elicited WTP.
After subjects indicate their choices for the BDM mechanism, their decision for the
Figure 2.2: BDM Mechanism Decision Screen
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randomly selected choice is implemented, and the earnings information is shown to subjects,
if applicable. Then, subjects are again asked for their beliefs about their own future an-
nual earnings, five years after graduation. Subjects conclude the experiment by answering
demographic questions, and are paid their base payment and bonuses at the end of the
experimental session.
To examine how the instrumental value of information interacts with information avoidance,
subjects will be randomly assigned to take the experiment either one week before before or one
week after the university’s course add deadline for the semester. In this way, the expeirment
exploits the field environment’s natural variation in the value of earnings information, as this
information is more valuable for subjects deciding between various fields of study before the
add deadline locks them into their courses for the semester, after which the costs associated
with switching a major are higher.
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3 Results
A total of 319 undergraduates at the University of Pennsylvania were recruited for the study.
190 subjects completed the experiment prior to the University of Pennsylvania’s course add
deadline, and 129 subjects completed the experiment after the deadline. 141 subjects were
underclassmen (freshmen or sophomores) and 178 subjects were upperclassmen (juniors or
seniors). Sessions lasted approximately 6 minutes on average, and the average bonus payment
was $3.75, which was paid on top of the base payment of $5.
3.1 Earnings Beliefs
Figure 3.1 plots subjects’ mean population earnings beliefs for each major field against the
ACS population earnings estimates. For the majority of fields, subjects overestimate earnings
on average. Mean absolute errors in estimates are substantial and consistent with previous
studies, ranging from $14,000 to $35,000 depending on field.
On average, subjects revised their self-earnings beliefs downward after receiving the
information, on average by -$11,380. This average excludes 1 subject who revised their self-
earnings beliefs by more than $500,000. Figure 3.2 plots the prior and posterior self-earnings
belief data, excluding 1 subject who revised their self earnings by more than $500,000.
Figure 3.1: Mean Earnings Beliefs vs. Actual Earnings
See Figure A.5 in the Appendix for Field Name abbreviations.
8
Figure 3.2: Prior vs. Posterior Self Earnings Beliefs
3.2 Willingness to Pay
Figure 3.3 plots the full distribution of willingness to pay for the earnings information. 58.62%
of subjects had a WTP of 0; 19.12% had a positive WTP. 22.26% of subjects had a WTP less
than or equal to 0, in which case we call them weakly information avoidant; 10.34% of subjects
had a WTP strictly less than 0, in which case we call them strictly information-avoidant.
To construct a numerical measure of willingness-to-pay, we assign one unique WTP value
for each range. For the 16 interior ranges, we assign the mean of the endpoints. For the
unbounded ranges, i.e. WTP less than $-2 or greater than $2, we assume that the conditional
distribution of WTP is triangular, with initial density equal to the average density over the
nearest four ranges. This gives $2.81 and $-2.24 as the conditional mean WTP on [2,∞] and
[−∞,−2], respectively. Using this measure, subjects on average have a positive WTP of $0.16.
Willingness to Pay by Year
Though we do not find significant differences in mean WTP between underclassmen
and upperclassmen (Table 3.1), the two populations exhibit different levels of information
avoidance.
Figure 3.4 plots three measures of WTP: the proportion of subjects with positive WTP, the
proportion of subjects that are weakly information avoidant, and the proportion of subjects
that are strictly information avoidant, conditional on the subject being an underclassman or
upperclassman.
Underclassmen are significantly more likely (p = 0.029) to be strictly information avoidant
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Figure 3.3: Willingness to Pay for Earnings Information
Figure 3.4: WTP Statistics by Year
Error bars denote standard errors.
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than upperclassmen. The difference in proportions for weak information avoidance is only
marginally significant (p = 0.054). Both effects remain significant controlling for the timing
of the study (see Table A.1 in the Appendix).
WTP by Timing of Study
Recall that subjects either participated in the study before (the Before Deadline group)
or after (the After Deadline group) the university’s course add deadline, in order to generate
variation in the instrumental value of the earnings information provided. We find that
subjects in the After Deadline group have a WTP that is $0.17 less than subjects in the
Before Deadline group on average (Table 3.1), a difference that is marginally significant
(p = 0.091).
As Figure 3.5 shows, subjects in the After Deadline group exhibit are significantly less
likely to have a positive WTP for the information (p = 0.005). Subjects are more likely to
be weakly information avoidant after the deadline, though this difference is not significant
(p = 0.148) and strict information avoidance is identical between the two subject groups.
Focusing on underclassmen, the policy-relevant population, we find that the results above
Table 3.1: Mean (SE) WTP by Year and Study Timing
Before Deadline After Deadline Total
Underclassmen 0.16 (0.11) -0.06 (0.12) 0.08 (0.08)
Upperclassmen 0.29 (0.09) 0.13 (0.08) 0.22 (0.06)
Total 0.23 (0.07) 0.05 (0.07) 0.16 (0.05)
Figure 3.5: WTP Statistics by Study Timing
Error bars denote standard errors
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are qualitatively similar: as Table 3.1 shows, underclassmen in the Before Deadline group
have a higher WTP than those in the After Deadline group. Likewise, as Figure 3.6 shows, a
greater proportion of underclassmen in the Before Deadline group have a positive WTP and
are information avoidant than those in the After Deadline group, though these differences
are not significant.
3.3 Effects of Information Instrumentality on WTP
Because assignment of subjects to Before Deadline group versus the After Deadline group is
not random, one might be concerned that any observed effects are due to extraneous factors
that differ between the subject populations other than the variation in the instrumental value
of the earnings information. For example, the types of subjects opting to take the study
before versus after the add deadline may be different, or differences across the two batches of
experimental sessions may be driving any effects.
To properly identify the effect of the instrumental value of the information on WTP
for underclassmen, the most policy-relevant subject population, we exploit the presence of
upperclassmen in our sample. Our identification strategy relies on the assumption that the
timing of the study should have no effect on the WTP of upperclassmen through the channel
of the instrumental value of the information. We justify this assumption by noting that
Figure 3.6: WTP Statistics by Timing/Year
Error bars denote standard errors.
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1) The costs of changing majors is higher for upperclassmen, who are more likely to have
committed to a field of study and have fewer course units at their disposal to fulfill
requirements for other majors, and so the instrumental value of the earnings information
is likely negligible for upperclassmen, regardless of study timing.
2) Upperclassmen likely have more rigid prior beliefs about their own future earnings than
underclassmen, as they have a better sense of the their employment prospects after
graduation; upperclassmen are more likely to have full-time job offers after graduation,
or have internship offers that may lead to full-time return offers (we do see that
differences in elicited prior and posterior self-earnings beliefs for upperclassmen are
smaller in magnitude on average than those of underclassmen, though this difference is
not significant; see Table A.2 in the Appendix). This again implies that the instrumental
value of earnings information is negligible for upperclassmen, regardless of study timing.
These factors make it likely that differences between upperclassmen in the Before Deadline
and After Deadline groups are driven by extraneous factors other than the differences in
instrumental value of the information for the two groups. If this assumption holds, then we
can estimate the effect of the change in instrumental value of information as a result of the
timing of the study via differences-in-differences, using the regression specification
wtpi = β0 + β1groupi + β2yeari + γ(groupi ∗ yeari) + i
where wtp is the WTP measure of interest, group and year are dummies equal to 1 when the
subject is in in the After Deadline group and is an underclassman, respectively, and γ is the
desired differences-in-differences estimator. Table 3.2 reports regression estimates for three
measures of WTP: our numerical measure, the proportion of weakly information avoidant
subjects, and the proportion of strictly information avoidant subjects.
For all three measures of WTP, the differences-in-differences estimator is not significantly
different from 0, though directionally, the estimates suggest that reducing the instrumental
value of information increases the likelihood that subjects are information-avoidant.
Table 3.2: Differences-in-Differences Regression
WTP ($) % Weakly Info Avoidant % Strictly Info Avoidant
(Intercept) 0.287∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗
(0.090) (0.041) (0.030)
Group −0.154 0.049 −0.027
(0.137) (0.063) (0.046)
Year −0.122 0.078 0.056
(0.131) (0.060) (0.044)
Group*Year −0.071 0.061 0.066
(0.208) (0.096) (0.070)
R2 0.016 0.023 0.020
RMSE 0.902 0.414 0.303
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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3.4 Beliefs and Willingness to Pay
Central to theoretical models of information avoidance is the role that beliefs play in the utility
function (Golman et al. 2017), either by directly entering the utility function, or by impacting
material outcomes. Given the role of beliefs in such models, we gather subjective beliefs
data in our study to investigate potential relationships between beliefs and our measures of
information avoidance.
In particular, we might expect that the strength of individuals’ prior self-earings beliefs
to have a relationship with their demand for information. For example, if a subject has
the rational expectation that their self-earnings beliefs are unlikely to change in response to
receiving the earnings information, we might expect that the subject will not only have a low
willingness to pay for the information, but also be unlikely to avoid the information, as it has
little bearing on the subject’s beliefs and thus her anticipatory utility.
To test for such hypothesized relationships, we use the regression specification
yi = β0 + β1|updatei|+ λXi + i
where yi is the information avoidance measure of interest (either the continuous WTP measure
or an indicator for whether the subject is information avoidant), |update| gives the absolute
difference between the subject’s prior and posterior self-earnings beliefs in thousands of
dollars, and X collects control variables (including subject year and group assignment). Table
3.3 reports regression results, excluding subjects for which the probability of receiving the
earnings information was endogenous to their responses to the BDM mechanism1.
We do not find that the coefficient estimate for update is significantly different from 0
for any of the information avoidance measures. The coefficient estimates for the regressions
involving the proportion of weakly information avoidant and the proportion of strictly
Table 3.3: Information Avoidance vs. Belief Update Magnitude
WTP ($) % Weakly Info Avoidant % Strictly Info Avoidant
(Intercept) 0.2946∗∗∗ 0.1431∗∗∗ 0.0546
(0.0822) (0.0410) (0.0282)
|Update| 0.0000 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0002)
Group −0.1071 0.0545 −0.0102
(0.1009) (0.0503) (0.0346)
Year −0.1853 0.1018∗ 0.0756∗
(0.1007) (0.0502) (0.0345)
R2 0.0155 0.0196 0.0212
RMSE 0.8223 0.4100 0.2817
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
1Subjects were excluded if they were willing to pay $2 to avoid the information, or if the BDM mechanism
selected any decision other than the decision that asked subjects to make the above tradeoff to be implemented.
45 subjects were excluded in total.
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information avoidant subjects are in the hypothesized direction, though the effect size of
these estimates are economically insignicant.
In addition to the magnitude of updating, one might expect that information avoidance
might be correlated with the direction of updating. For example, if a subject expects that
it is likely she will revise her self-earnings beliefs downward in response to the earnings
information, she might be more likely to avoid the information. Such an account would
mean that the subject both (1) holds miscalibrated (either overly optimistic or pessimistic)
beliefs, and also (2) is aware to some extent that beliefs are miscalibrated. Though these
assumptions may seem problematic, they are in fact instantiated in a class of models where
individuals “choose what to believe”; in such models, individuals choose the optimal belief
and belief-consistent set of actions out of a feasible set of belief-action pairs (Brunnermeier &
Parker 2005, Köszegi 2010).
To test for the above relationship, we use the regression specification
yi = β0 + β1(updatei < 0) + λXi + i
where yi is the information avoidance measure of interest (either the continuous WTP measure
or an indicator for whether the subject is information avoidant), (update > 0) is a indicator
equal to 1 if the subject’s posterior self-earnings beliefs are strictly less than their prior
self-earnings beliefs and 0 otherwise, and X collects control variables (including subject year
and group assignment). Table 3.4 reports regression results, again excluding subjects for
which the probability of receiving the earnings information was endogenous to their responses
to the BDM mechanism.
We do not find the coefficient for the direction of belief updating to be significantly
different from 0.
Table 3.4: Information Avoidance vs. Belief Update Direction
WTP ($) % Weakly Info Avoidant % Strictly Info Avoidant
(Intercept) 0.2471∗∗ 0.1412∗∗ 0.0778∗
(0.0907) (0.0453) (0.0310)
Update<0 0.1175 0.0122 −0.0499
(0.1002) (0.0501) (0.0343)
Group −0.1062 0.0540 −0.0111
(0.1006) (0.0503) (0.0345)
Year −0.1977 0.1026∗ 0.0829∗
(0.1006) (0.0503) (0.0345)
R2 0.0204 0.0188 0.0270
RMSE 0.8202 0.4102 0.2809
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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4 Discussion
In this study, we investigate how much college undergraduates are willing to pay to obtain
information about the relationship between major choice and future earnings. While previous
literature in this domain has established that undergraduates are systematically misinformed
about the major-earnings relationship, and has documented the effectiveness of interventions
focused on correcting miscalibrated beleifs, this study investigates why beliefs are miscalibrated
in the first place, and in particular, whether this miscalibration is the result of information
avoidance.
We find that 10.34% of subjects are information avoidant, in that they are willing to
pay to avoid receiving the earnings information. In adddition, we find that the incidence of
information avoidance is greater among underclassmen subjects (freshmen and sophomores)
vs. upperclassment subjects (juniors and seniors), and we also find that the incidence of
information avoidance amongst underclassmen in particular increases after the course add
deadline, evidence suggestive of the hypothesis that the incidence of information avoidance
increases when the instrumental value of the information is lower.
Our findings raise a number of policy questions. In particular, the fact that undergraduates
are willing to pay to avoid information about the major-earnings relationship raises questions
about the welfare implications of interventions aimed at correcting students’ miscalibrated
beliefs. Furthermore, the fact that the incidence of information avoidance is highest among
underclassmen, the most policy-relevant target for such interventions, compounds these
welfare implications. Key to resolving these normative questions is obtaining a better
understanding of the mechanisms driving information avoidance. For example, certain models
posit information avoidance as the result of preference distortions caused by present bias in a
multiperiod investment decision (Benabou & Tirole 2002); if such a model truly underlied
behavior, a case might be made for interventions aimed at mitigating such distortionary
effects of present bias. On the other hand, if agents avoid information in order to prevent
negative shocks to their anticipatory or ego utility (Brunnermeier & Parker 2005, Köszegi
2006, Köszegi 2010, Caplin & Leahy 2001), then it may not be the case that such interventions
are purely welfare-positive. These questions suggest a line of future empirical work testing
various models of information avoidance to better understand the mechanisms driving this
behavior in policy-relevant domains.
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A Appendix
Figure A.1: Major Elicitation Screen
19
Figure A.2: Belief Elicitation Screen
20
Figure A.3: BDM Mechanism Instructions Screen
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Figure A.4: Earnings Information Screen
22
Figure A.5: Field of Study Classification
Biology and Chemistry: Biochemistry; Biological Basis of Behavior, Biology; Biophysics;
Chemistry; Nutrition Science
Natural Sciences: Cognitive Science; Earth Science; Environmental Studies; Geology,
Physics & Astronomy
Communications, Media, and Marketing: Communication; Visual Studies; Marketing;
Marketing & Communication; Marketing & Operations Management
Economics and Business: Economics; Mathematical Economics; Accounting; Actuarial
Science; Behavioral Economics; Business Economics & Public Policy; Environmental Policy
& Management; Finance; Global Analysis; Health Care Management and Policy; Insurance
& Risk Management; Legal Studies & Business Ethics; Management; Managing Electronic
Commerce; Operations & Information Management; Real Estate; Retailing; Social Impact &
Responsibility; Statistics
Engineering: Bioengineering; Chemical and Biomolecular Engineering; Electrical
Engineering; Materials Science and Engineering; Mechanical Engineering and Applied
Mechanics; Systems Science and Engineering; Biomedical Science
Humanities: Africana Studies; Ancient History; Cinema Studies; Classical Studies;
Comparative Literature; East Asian Area Studies; East Asian Languages and Civilizations;
English; French and Francophone Studies; Gender, Sexuality and Women’s Studies; German;
Hispanic Studies; History; History of Art; Italian Studies; Jewish Studies, Latin American
and Latino Studies; Modern Middle Eastern Studies; Near Eastern Languages and
Civilizations; Philosophy, Religious Studies; Romance Languages; Russian; South Asia
Studies; Spanish
Math and Computers: Logic, Information and Computation; Mathematics; Computer
Engineering; Computer Science; Digital Media Design; Networked and Social Systems
Engineering; Computational Biology
Nursing: Nursing
Visual/Performing Arts and Architecture: Architecture; Fine Arts; Music; Theatre
Arts
Social Science: Anthropology; Criminology; Health and Societies; International Relations;
Linguistics; Philosophy, Politics and Economics; Political Science; Psychology; Science,
Technology and Society; Sociology; Urban Studies
23
Table A.1: Information Avoidance vs. Year
% Weakly Info Avoidant % Strictly Info Avoidant
(Intercept) 0.147∗∗∗ 0.067∗
(0.037) (0.027)
Year 0.102∗ 0.082∗
(0.047) (0.034)
Group 0.075 0.001
(0.047) (0.035)
R2 0.021 0.018
RMSE 0.413 0.303
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05.
Y ear = 1 if subject is an underclassmen, 0 otherwise. Group = 1 if subject is assigned to After
Deadline group, 0 otherwise.
Table A.2: Self Earnings Belief Update Magnitude vs. Year
(1) |update| (2) |update|
(Intercept) 16.046∗∗ 17.589∗
(5.860) (7.153)
Year 12.462 12.182
(8.782) (8.827)
Group −3.351
(8.879)
R2 0.007 0.008
RMSE 72.249 72.363
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05.
|update| is the absolute difference between the subject’s prior and pos-
terior self-earnings beliefs, in thousands of dollars. Y ear = 1 if subject
is an underclassman, 0 otherwise. Group = 1 if subject is assigned to
After Deadline group, 0 otherwise. Regression excludes 45 subjects
for which the probability of receiving the earnings information was
endogenous to their responses to the BDM mechanism.
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